| Name |
Mahon, Docloer D /Mahan [1, 2] |
| Birth |
15 Oct 1853 |
Logan County, West Virginia, USA [1, 2] |
|
| Gender |
Male |
| Residence |
1880 |
Magnolia, Mingo, West Virginia, USA [1, 2] |
| feud |
8 Aug 1882 |
Blackberry Creek, Blackberry, Pike, Kentucky, USA [3] |
| Paw Paw Incident: Joseph Hatfield Deposition- The killing of Tolbert, Pharmer, and Bud McCoy by a Hatfield-led gang on August 8, 1882 represented one of the most sensational events of the Hatfield-McCoy Feud. What follows is Joseph Hatfield’s deposition regarding the affair: |
- 20230524GHLn-
Brandon Ray Kirk
Paw Paw Incident: Joseph Hatfield Deposition (1889)
Monday 04 Jun 2018
Posted by Brandon Ray Kirk in Culture of Honor, Hatfield-McCoy Feud, Matewan?
The killing of Tolbert, Pharmer, and Bud McCoy by a Hatfield-led gang on August 8, 1882 represented one of the most sensational events of the Hatfield-McCoy Feud. What follows is Joseph Hatfield’s deposition regarding the affair:
COMMONWEALTH VS DOC MAYHORN &C
Bill of Exceptions
FILED Sept. 1889
G.W. Pinson, Clk
IMG_9725
Joseph Hatfield was then introduced as a witness for Deft. whos Testified as followeth. I know the Defts. I was a justice of the peace in 1882. Mathew hatfield had charge of the McCoy Boys. I Don’t remember of having seen either one of the Defts. on Blackbary Creek the Day when the McCoy Boys was Taken from the officers. Wall Hatfield said to Randolph McCoy after the Crowd had started Down the Creek with the Prisoners. We understand that we are to be Bush whacked and if we are we will kill the three Boys.
To the above testimony of Jo Hatfield the Deft. objected at the Time and still objects. The Court over ruled the objection. Defts. excepts and still excepts.
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Paw Paw Incident: James Hatfield Deposition (1889)
June 3, 2018
In "Culture of Honor"
Paw Paw Incident: Tolbert Hatfield Deposition (1889)
June 7, 2018
In "Culture of Honor"
Paw Paw Incident: W.S. Ferrell Deposition (1889)
May 31, 2018
In "Culture of Honor"
|
| feud |
Abt 1887 |
Pikeville, Pike, Kentucky, USA [4] |
| Valentine was named in warrants along with two of his sons-in-law, Doc and Plyant Mayhorn. Hhe and his sons-in-laws wished to surrender in Pikeville and stand trial for crimes for which they were accused. Allen Hatfield recalled the incident from his boyhood, including the feud. His father did go to Pikeville to voluntarily stand trial and clear his name but he was convicted by a prejudiced jury, the son remembered, and was sentenced to life imprisonment at the Kentucky State Prison in Frankfort. After sentencing, he lived about one year and his burial place is still unknown today. The two Mayhorns served several years and were later pardoned. |
- 20230521GHLn-
Allen Hatfield of Beech Creek, WV (1970s)
Tuesday 11 Sep 2018
Posted by Brandon Ray Kirk in Hatfield-McCoy Feud, Matewan, Tazewell County? 4 Comments
TagsAllen Hatfield, Appalachia, Beech Creek, Beni Kedem, Charleston, Charlie Simpkins, Cincinnati, civil war, Clyde Kiser, Deanna Hatfield, Devil Anse Hatfield, Devon Church of Christ, Doc Mayhorn, Eliza Murphy, Ellison Hatfield, feuds, Frankfort, genealogy, Goldie Hatfield, Gordon Smith, Grapevine Fork, Hatfield-McCoy Feud, history, Hugh C. Boyd Lodge No. 119, Jane Hatfield, Jane Maynard, Joseph Chester Hatfield, Joseph Murphy, Kentucky, Kentucky Colonels, Lawrence Hatfield, Logan County, Major Hatfield, Martha Bell Murphy, Maryland, Mingo County, Norfolk and Western Railroad, North Tazewell, Ohio, Pike County, Plyant Mayhorn, preacher, Raymond Hatfield, Right Hand Fork, Rockville, Thacker, Valentine Wall Hatfield, Virginia, West Virginia, Williamson, Williamson Memorial Hospital, Willis Hatfield
My name is Deanna Hatfield and tonight I would like to share with you a West Virginian, Allen Hatfield, who the community of Beech Creek honored and loved. Allen was born October 11, 1877. He was the youngest child of the pioneer couple, Wall Valentine Hatfield and Jane Maynard Hatfield, who settled on Beech Creek in 1861, the year that the Civil War broke out in this country. His parents had settled at the mouth of Grapevine Fork of Beech Creek. They had occupied a log cabin near the present site of Lawrence Hatfield’s home. He was the nephew of Captain Devil Anse Hatfield, clan leader in the famed Hatfield-McCoy Feud, and a first cousin of Willis Hatfield, the only surviving child of that family.
Almost until the day of his death, Allen carried a sadness in his heart over the death of his father in the days of the famous feud. His father, a peaceable man, was not an active member of the fighting group of the Hatfields during the trouble between his family and the McCoys but was named in warrants along with two of his sons-in-law, Doc and Plyant Mayhorn. Allen Hatfield, but ten years old at the time, remembered that his father Wall, thinking that he had nothing to fear in the courts of Kentucky, wrote the prosecuting attorney of Pike County that he and his sons-in-laws wished to surrender in Pikeville and stand trial for crimes for which they were accused. Allen Hatfield recalled the incident from his boyhood, including the feud. His father did go to Pikeville to voluntarily stand trial and clear his name but he was convicted by a prejudiced jury, the son remembered, and was sentenced to life imprisonment at the Kentucky State Prison in Frankfort. After sentencing, he lived about one year and his burial place is still unknown today. The two Mayhorns served several years and were later pardoned.
One of his fondest memories was that of his mother Jane who took over the management of the home and did a good job of raising a large family after her husband was taken from her. She did chores around the homestead. A great and interesting conversationalist in his adult years, he liked to tell of how he and his friends made bows and arrows-arrows consisting of straight pieces of wood with a horseshoe nails attached as the spike. He became an excellent marksman with the bow and arrow and later with his first rifle as he helped to provide squirrels and other wild game for the family table.
The early years of Hatfield’s life were marked by sadness as a result of the loss of his family in the feud. But his hours spent in the great outdoors hunting and fishing provided a therapy that led to his development to splendid manhood. He was several years old when the Norfolk and Western Railroad Company built an extension from Virginia to southern West Virginia and Mingo County, which still was Logan County at that time.
In 1899, Hatfield was married to Martha Bell Murphy, daughter of Joseph and Eliza (Steele) Murphy. She had just turned fourteen when he proposed and her family thought she was too young to wed. The young couple sort of eloped the night of April 8, 1899, to Allen’s home where they were married by Allen’s brother, Ellison, a country preacher and a granny doctor, as he later recalled. Late that summer, he amassed enough lumber to build their first home-a one-room abode that was erected next to the hillside just north of the present homestead. Allen Hatfield made most of his furniture and his wife tended a garden and dug ginseng to help the family fortune.
During the ensuing years, the Hatfields had eleven children, two of whom preceded them in death.
Lawrence Hatfield, who married Dollie Kiser, is now retired and lives with Dollie on Beech Creek at the mouth of Grapevine Fork.
Estel Hatfield, who married Virginia Varney, lived with his dad and still lives in the old homeplace. Estel is an agent for the Norfolk and Western Railroad Company.
Major Hatfield, who married Mildred Friend, is employed as an agent also for the Norfolk and Western Railroad Company in North Tazewell, Virginia.
Rosa Hatfield, married Wayne Simpkins, lives on Beech Creek on Right Hand Fork.
Goldie Hatfield married Gordon Smith, and they make their home below Grapevine Fork on Beech Creek.
Mamie Hatfield married Charlie Simpkins and makes her home in Rockville, Maryland.
Glendeen Hatfield married Douglas Berlin, and they make their home in Louisiana.
Etta June Hatfield, never married and lives in Cincinnati, Ohio.
Erma Hatfield married Forest Baisden, and she lives in Williamson, West Virginia.
Milda Hatfield, deceased, was a retired school teacher and was never married.
Joseph Chester Hatfield, died at six months old.
In 1914, Allen bought from his brother Smith a grocery store at the old homeplace and moved the merchandise to a small building at his home. He built a large home later and it was there that most of the children were born. He expanded his business to a larger store building, which still stands, and then he erected the present homeplace. During his early merchandising days, Hatfield was compelled to haul his goods from the railway station at Devon by team and wagon for the roads had not been built and most of the rough team tracks was through the creeks. It was a problem in the wintertime to get through the streams as they were filled with ice. After the county built a road up Beech Creek, he retired his team and wagon and switched to a gasoline-powered vehicle to haul and deliver his goods. He learned carpentry in the early years of his marriage and continued this art until 1964 when he retired. Hatfield was a 57-year member of the Hugh C. Boyd Lodge No. 119 AF & AM at Matewan and received his 50-year service award from the Grand Lodge of West Virginia in 1970. The lodge, when he became a master mason, was known as Thacker No. 119. It was located at Thacker, West Virginia. It later was moved to Matewan. He also belonged to the Beni Kedem Temple of Charleston, being a 50-year member of the Shriners. He also received the honorary commission of a Kentucky Colonel on April 10, 1972. He had been a member of the Devon Church of Christ since 1916 and sponsored the building of the present church that stands near his home on Beech Creek.
In his years of selling groceries, Hatfield said he never lost but 50 dollars in bad debts. He was proud of his heritage, a leader in his community, and in his active life a crack shot with a rifle, pistol, and shotgun. His hunting and fishing kept the table supplied with food. He won beef, hogs, turkeys, and chickens in the old-time rifle matches that were so popular in the Beech Creek area years ago. He and the former Martha B. Murphy were married 71 years before her death on May 25, 1970. His life might have been used as the subject by the poet who wrote, “Let me live by the side of the road and be a friend to man.” Allen Hatfield had spent a lifetime doing just that, living beside a little country road on Beech Creek and being a friend to mankind. On March 2, 1975, Allen was taken to the Williamson Memorial Hospital for ailments associated with his advanced age. He then was released and re-entered the hospital on April 18 in critical condition. On Friday, May 2, 1975, the community of Beech Creek lost one of the dearest old-timers that was ever known. Allen Hatfield, 97, prominently-known Mingo pioneer citizen, retired merchant of Beech Creek, died at 3 a.m. in the Williamson Memorial Hospital of a lingering illness. Funeral services were scheduled at the Chambers Funeral Home Chapel with his beloved ministers Clyde Kiser and Raymond Hatfield officiating. Burial took place in the family cemetery behind the homeplace on Beech Creek. His grandsons and great-grandsons were his pallbearers. Allen would have wanted it this way. Simple.
NOTE: Some of the names may be transcribed incorrectly.
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Paw Paw Incident: Joseph Hatfield Deposition (1889)
June 4, 2018 In "Culture of Honor"
Paw Paw Incident: James M. McCoy Deposition (1889)
December 6, 2018 In "Hatfield-McCoy Feud"
Paw Paw Incident: Doc Mayhorn Deposition (1889)
September 7, 2018 In "Hatfield-McCoy Feud"
20250531GHLn-
20230522GHLn- LS
Lydia Smith originally shared this on 21 Jun 2012
Plyant and Doc Mahon Mayhorn
ca. 1930
Roger Mayhorn wrote on "The Real Hatfield, Real McCoy, Real Feud, Real Matewan" Facebook Page at: http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=439691882709966&set=o.313161122094765&type=1&permPage=1
"This is Plyant (left) and Doc Mayhorn/Mahon about 1930, sons-in-law of Valentine "Wall" Hatfield, brother to Devil Anse. This was after they came out of prison after having served 14 years for taking part in the killing of the three McCoy boys who had fought with Devil Anse's brother, Ellison. They had been sentenced to life, but were later pardoned. According to stories passed down in my family they didn't actually take part in the shooting of the boys, but they did stand guard upriver when it was happening."
Linked to
Pliant / Plyant J Moreman Mahon / Mayhon / Maghon / Mayhorn
Saved by (10 of 77)
TEDMROCHMM
Comments
an
annieosborne1234
10 years ago
my great great grand father: i think plyant was my great great grand father because harley mahon sr. was my great grand father and harley mahon jr was my grand father
great pic how do i get some pics of my ancesters if anyone has any
plese email me at mahonjr@hotmail.com
|
| Prison |
Between 1887 and 1901 |
Frankfort, Franklin, Kentucky, USA |
| 14 yr. Valentine was sentenced to life imprisonment at the Kentucky State Prison in Frankfort. After sentencing, he lived about one year and his burial place is still unknown today. The two Mayhorns served several years and were later pardoned. |
- Almost until the day of his death, Allen carried a sadness in his heart over the death of his father in the days of the famous feud. His father, a peaceable man, was not an active member of the fighting group of the Hatfields during the trouble between his family and the McCoys but was named in warrants along with two of his sons-in-law, Doc and Plyant Mayhorn. Allen Hatfield, but ten years old at the time, remembered that his father Wall, thinking that he had nothing to fear in the courts of Kentucky, wrote the prosecuting attorney of Pike County that he and his sons-in-laws wished to surrender in Pikeville and stand trial for crimes for which they were accused. Allen Hatfield recalled the incident from his boyhood, including the feud. His father did go to Pikeville to voluntarily stand trial and clear his name but he was convicted by a prejudiced jury, the son remembered, and was sentenced to life imprisonment at the Kentucky State Prison in Frankfort. After sentencing, he lived about one year and his burial place is still unknown today. The two Mayhorns served several years and were later pardoned.
|
| Arrest |
Abt Jan 1887 |
Pikeville, Pike, Kentucky, USA [4] |
| Valentine was named in warrants along with two of his sons-in-law, Doc and Plyant Mayhorn. Hhe and his sons-in-laws wished to surrender in Pikeville and stand trial for crimes for which they were accused. Allen Hatfield recalled the incident from his boyhood, including the feud. His father did go to Pikeville to voluntarily stand trial and clear his name but he was convicted by a prejudiced jury, the son remembered, and was sentenced to life imprisonment at the Kentucky State Prison in Frankfort. After sentencing, he lived about one year and his burial place is still unknown today. The two Mayhorns served several years and were later pardoned. |
- 20230521GHLn-
Allen Hatfield of Beech Creek, WV (1970s)
Tuesday 11 Sep 2018
Posted by Brandon Ray Kirk in Hatfield-McCoy Feud, Matewan, Tazewell County? 4 Comments
TagsAllen Hatfield, Appalachia, Beech Creek, Beni Kedem, Charleston, Charlie Simpkins, Cincinnati, civil war, Clyde Kiser, Deanna Hatfield, Devil Anse Hatfield, Devon Church of Christ, Doc Mayhorn, Eliza Murphy, Ellison Hatfield, feuds, Frankfort, genealogy, Goldie Hatfield, Gordon Smith, Grapevine Fork, Hatfield-McCoy Feud, history, Hugh C. Boyd Lodge No. 119, Jane Hatfield, Jane Maynard, Joseph Chester Hatfield, Joseph Murphy, Kentucky, Kentucky Colonels, Lawrence Hatfield, Logan County, Major Hatfield, Martha Bell Murphy, Maryland, Mingo County, Norfolk and Western Railroad, North Tazewell, Ohio, Pike County, Plyant Mayhorn, preacher, Raymond Hatfield, Right Hand Fork, Rockville, Thacker, Valentine Wall Hatfield, Virginia, West Virginia, Williamson, Williamson Memorial Hospital, Willis Hatfield
My name is Deanna Hatfield and tonight I would like to share with you a West Virginian, Allen Hatfield, who the community of Beech Creek honored and loved. Allen was born October 11, 1877. He was the youngest child of the pioneer couple, Wall Valentine Hatfield and Jane Maynard Hatfield, who settled on Beech Creek in 1861, the year that the Civil War broke out in this country. His parents had settled at the mouth of Grapevine Fork of Beech Creek. They had occupied a log cabin near the present site of Lawrence Hatfield’s home. He was the nephew of Captain Devil Anse Hatfield, clan leader in the famed Hatfield-McCoy Feud, and a first cousin of Willis Hatfield, the only surviving child of that family.
Almost until the day of his death, Allen carried a sadness in his heart over the death of his father in the days of the famous feud. His father, a peaceable man, was not an active member of the fighting group of the Hatfields during the trouble between his family and the McCoys but was named in warrants along with two of his sons-in-law, Doc and Plyant Mayhorn. Allen Hatfield, but ten years old at the time, remembered that his father Wall, thinking that he had nothing to fear in the courts of Kentucky, wrote the prosecuting attorney of Pike County that he and his sons-in-laws wished to surrender in Pikeville and stand trial for crimes for which they were accused. Allen Hatfield recalled the incident from his boyhood, including the feud. His father did go to Pikeville to voluntarily stand trial and clear his name but he was convicted by a prejudiced jury, the son remembered, and was sentenced to life imprisonment at the Kentucky State Prison in Frankfort. After sentencing, he lived about one year and his burial place is still unknown today. The two Mayhorns served several years and were later pardoned.
One of his fondest memories was that of his mother Jane who took over the management of the home and did a good job of raising a large family after her husband was taken from her. She did chores around the homestead. A great and interesting conversationalist in his adult years, he liked to tell of how he and his friends made bows and arrows-arrows consisting of straight pieces of wood with a horseshoe nails attached as the spike. He became an excellent marksman with the bow and arrow and later with his first rifle as he helped to provide squirrels and other wild game for the family table.
The early years of Hatfield’s life were marked by sadness as a result of the loss of his family in the feud. But his hours spent in the great outdoors hunting and fishing provided a therapy that led to his development to splendid manhood. He was several years old when the Norfolk and Western Railroad Company built an extension from Virginia to southern West Virginia and Mingo County, which still was Logan County at that time.
In 1899, Hatfield was married to Martha Bell Murphy, daughter of Joseph and Eliza (Steele) Murphy. She had just turned fourteen when he proposed and her family thought she was too young to wed. The young couple sort of eloped the night of April 8, 1899, to Allen’s home where they were married by Allen’s brother, Ellison, a country preacher and a granny doctor, as he later recalled. Late that summer, he amassed enough lumber to build their first home-a one-room abode that was erected next to the hillside just north of the present homestead. Allen Hatfield made most of his furniture and his wife tended a garden and dug ginseng to help the family fortune.
During the ensuing years, the Hatfields had eleven children, two of whom preceded them in death.
Lawrence Hatfield, who married Dollie Kiser, is now retired and lives with Dollie on Beech Creek at the mouth of Grapevine Fork.
Estel Hatfield, who married Virginia Varney, lived with his dad and still lives in the old homeplace. Estel is an agent for the Norfolk and Western Railroad Company.
Major Hatfield, who married Mildred Friend, is employed as an agent also for the Norfolk and Western Railroad Company in North Tazewell, Virginia.
Rosa Hatfield, married Wayne Simpkins, lives on Beech Creek on Right Hand Fork.
Goldie Hatfield married Gordon Smith, and they make their home below Grapevine Fork on Beech Creek.
Mamie Hatfield married Charlie Simpkins and makes her home in Rockville, Maryland.
Glendeen Hatfield married Douglas Berlin, and they make their home in Louisiana.
Etta June Hatfield, never married and lives in Cincinnati, Ohio.
Erma Hatfield married Forest Baisden, and she lives in Williamson, West Virginia.
Milda Hatfield, deceased, was a retired school teacher and was never married.
Joseph Chester Hatfield, died at six months old.
In 1914, Allen bought from his brother Smith a grocery store at the old homeplace and moved the merchandise to a small building at his home. He built a large home later and it was there that most of the children were born. He expanded his business to a larger store building, which still stands, and then he erected the present homeplace. During his early merchandising days, Hatfield was compelled to haul his goods from the railway station at Devon by team and wagon for the roads had not been built and most of the rough team tracks was through the creeks. It was a problem in the wintertime to get through the streams as they were filled with ice. After the county built a road up Beech Creek, he retired his team and wagon and switched to a gasoline-powered vehicle to haul and deliver his goods. He learned carpentry in the early years of his marriage and continued this art until 1964 when he retired. Hatfield was a 57-year member of the Hugh C. Boyd Lodge No. 119 AF & AM at Matewan and received his 50-year service award from the Grand Lodge of West Virginia in 1970. The lodge, when he became a master mason, was known as Thacker No. 119. It was located at Thacker, West Virginia. It later was moved to Matewan. He also belonged to the Beni Kedem Temple of Charleston, being a 50-year member of the Shriners. He also received the honorary commission of a Kentucky Colonel on April 10, 1972. He had been a member of the Devon Church of Christ since 1916 and sponsored the building of the present church that stands near his home on Beech Creek.
In his years of selling groceries, Hatfield said he never lost but 50 dollars in bad debts. He was proud of his heritage, a leader in his community, and in his active life a crack shot with a rifle, pistol, and shotgun. His hunting and fishing kept the table supplied with food. He won beef, hogs, turkeys, and chickens in the old-time rifle matches that were so popular in the Beech Creek area years ago. He and the former Martha B. Murphy were married 71 years before her death on May 25, 1970. His life might have been used as the subject by the poet who wrote, “Let me live by the side of the road and be a friend to man.” Allen Hatfield had spent a lifetime doing just that, living beside a little country road on Beech Creek and being a friend to mankind. On March 2, 1975, Allen was taken to the Williamson Memorial Hospital for ailments associated with his advanced age. He then was released and re-entered the hospital on April 18 in critical condition. On Friday, May 2, 1975, the community of Beech Creek lost one of the dearest old-timers that was ever known. Allen Hatfield, 97, prominently-known Mingo pioneer citizen, retired merchant of Beech Creek, died at 3 a.m. in the Williamson Memorial Hospital of a lingering illness. Funeral services were scheduled at the Chambers Funeral Home Chapel with his beloved ministers Clyde Kiser and Raymond Hatfield officiating. Burial took place in the family cemetery behind the homeplace on Beech Creek. His grandsons and great-grandsons were his pallbearers. Allen would have wanted it this way. Simple.
NOTE: Some of the names may be transcribed incorrectly.
Share this:
EmailFacebookLinkedInPinterestTumblrTwitter
Paw Paw Incident: Joseph Hatfield Deposition (1889)
June 4, 2018 In "Culture of Honor"
Paw Paw Incident: James M. McCoy Deposition (1889)
December 6, 2018 In "Hatfield-McCoy Feud"
Paw Paw Incident: Doc Mayhorn Deposition (1889)
September 7, 2018 In "Hatfield-McCoy Feud"
|
| jurisprudence |
Between Dec 1887 and 1 Feb 1888 |
| habeus corpus, regarding kidnapping of the Mahon brothers in WV and deposited in KY where they were arrested, tried, and convicted. |
- 20230522GHLn- Posted 30 Sep 2015 by wendy esko
U.S. Supreme Court
U.S. Supreme Court Mahon v. Justice (1888)
Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700 (1888)
Mahon v. Justice
No. 1411
Argued April 23-24, 1888
Decided May 14, 1888
127 U.S. 700
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
Syllabus
No mode is provided by the Constitution and laws of the United States by which a person, unlawfully abducted from one state to another and held in the latter state upon process of law for an offense against the state, can be restored to the state from which he was abducted.
There is no comity between the states by which a person held upon an indictment for a criminal offense in one state can be turned over to the authorities of another state, although abducted from the latter.
A, being indicted in Kentucky for felony, escaped to West Virginia. While the Governor of West Virginia was considering an application from the Governor of Kentucky for his surrender as a fugitive from justice, he was forcibly abducted to Kentucky, and when there was seized by the Kentucky authorities under legal process, and put in jail and held to answer the indictment. Held that he was not entitled to be discharged from custody under a writ of habeas corpus from the circuit court of the United States.
The Court stated the case as follows:
On the 9th of February, 1888, the Governor of West Virginia, on behalf of that state, presented to the District Court of the United States for the District of Kentucky a petition, representing that during the month of September, 1887, a requisition was made upon him as governor aforesaid, by the Governor of Kentucky, for Plyant Mahon, alleged to have committed murder in the latter state and to have fled from its justice and to be then at large in West Virginia; that pending correspondence between the two governors, and the consideration of legal questions growing out of the requisition, and during the month of December, 1887, or January, 1888, the said Plyant Mahon, while residing in West Virginia, was, in violation of her laws, and of the Constitution and laws of the United States and without warrant or other legal process, arrested by a body of armed men from Kentucky, and by force and against his will, conveyed out of the State of
Page 127 U. S. 701
West Virginia into the County of Pike, in the State of Kentucky, and there confined in the common jail of the county, where he has been ever since, and deprived of his liberty by the keeper thereof.
The petitioner further represented that on the 1st of February, 1888, he, as Governor of West Virginia and on her behalf, made a requisition upon the Governor of Kentucky that Plyant Mahon be released from confinement, set at large, and returned in safety to the State of West Virginia, and that the demand was, on the 4th of that month, refused on the ground, among others, that the questions involved were judicial, and not executive. The petitioner, therefore, in alleged vindication of the rights of the State of West Virginia and of every citizen thereof and especially of the said Plyant Mahon, thus confined and deprived of his liberty, to the end that due process of law secured by both the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of West Virginia, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, might be respected and enforced, prayed that the writ of habeas corpus be granted, directed to the keeper of the jail, commanding him to produce the body of said Plyant Mahon, together with the cause of his detention, before the judge of the court at such time and place as might be designated, and that judgment be rendered that said Plyant Mahon be discharged from said confinement and custody and be safely returned within the jurisdiction of the State of West Virginia. At the same time, another petition was presented to the court by one John A. Sheppard, representing that he was a citizen of West Virginia and setting forth substantially the facts contained in the petition of the governor, and praying for a like writ of habeas corpus. Subsequently the name of Plyant Mahon was substituted for that of John A. Sheppard, and the proceedings on the petition were conducted in his name.
The court ordered the writ to issue, directed to the jailer of Pike County, requiring him to produce the body of Mahon before the District Court of the United States in the City of Louisville on the 20th of the month, and there to abide such order as might be made in the premises. The jailer of the
Page 127 U. S. 702
county, Abner Justice, made a return to the writ substantially as follows: that he held Plyant Mahon in custody and confined in the jail of Pike County by virtue of and in obedience to three writs issued by the clerk of the criminal court of the county, under its order, each for the arrest of Mahon to answer an indictment pending against him and others for the crime of willful murder, alleged to have been committed in that county, a crime for the trial of which that court had full jurisdiction, and commanding the officer arresting Mahon to deliver him to the jailer of the county, copies of which writs were annexed to the return; that under the writ of habeas corpus, he was proceeding to the City of Louisville to produce the body of Mahon before the United States district court there when he was met on his way by the United States marshal of the district of Kentucky, who, by virtue of the order of the district court, took Plyant Mahon into his custody. He further returned that three indictments against Mahon and others for willful murder were found by the grand jury of Pike County, Kentucky, and returned into the circuit court of said county at its September term, 1882, at which time that court had jurisdiction of the crime charged; that by order of the court, made at each subsequent term, writs were issued by the clerk thereof for the arrest of Plyant Mahon to answer the indictments, until the criminal court of the county was established by act of the General Assembly of Kentucky in 1884, by which the jurisdiction previously vested in the circuit court was transferred to and vested in said criminal court; that by orders of this latter court from term to term, writs were issued by the clerk thereof for the arrest of Mahon to answer the indictments; but none of them were executed upon him until January 12, 1888, when he was arrested in Pike County by the sheriff thereof and delivered by him to the respondent, jailer of said county, in obedience to the writs which were issued, and under the command and authority of which he was held by the respondent as jailer in custody in the jail of said county, when the writ of habeas corpus was served upon him.
The jailer subsequently, by leave of the court, made a
Page 127 U. S. 703
further return in which he stated that a requisition was made by the Governor of Kentucky upon the Governor of West Virginia for the arrest and rendition to Kentucky of said Plyant Mahon as alleged in the governor's petition; that it was accompanied by a copy of the indictments referred to, certified by the Governor of Kentucky to be authentic; that at the same time the governor appointed on Frank Phillips as the agent of the state to receive and bring to the State of Kentucky the said Mahon, as provided by law in such cases; that on the 30th of September, 1887, the Governor of West Virginia returned said requisition to the Governor of Kentucky, informing him that an affidavit, as required by the statute of West Virginia, should accompany the requisition before the same could be complied with; that thereafter the Governor of Kentucky returned the requisition to the Governor of West Virginia, accompanied by the affidavit required; that afterwards, about the 12th of January, 1888, Frank Phillips and others, with force and arms, violently seized the said Mahon in the State of West Virginia and brought him against his will into the County of Pike in the State of Kentucky, where the writs mentioned in the respondent's original return were executed upon him by the Sheriff of Pike County; that at that time, no warrant for the arrest of Mahon had been issued or ordered to be issued by the Governor of West Virginia in compliance with said requisition, and afterwards, on the 30th of January, 1888, he informed the Governor of Kentucky that he declined to issue his warrant for the arrest of Plyant Mahon, in compliance with the requisition made upon him, because he had become satisfied, upon investigation of the facts, that Mahn was not guilty of the crime charged against him in the indictments, and that subsequently, on the 1st of February, 1888, the Governor of West Virginia made upon the Governor of Kentucky a demand for the release of Mahon from the jail of the County of Pike and his safe conduct back into West Virginia, with which demand the Governor of Kentucky declined to comply on the ground that Mahon was in the custody of the judicial department of the commonwealth, and that the question of his release upon the grounds alleged in the demand
Page 127 U. S. 704
was one which the courts alone could determine, and that the adjudication thereof was not one within the purview of his powers and duties as governor. The facts thus detailed were established before the court on the hearing upon the writ, and are contained in its findings.
On the 3d of March, the court denied the motion for the discharge of Plyant Mahon and ordered the marshal to return him to the jailer of Pike County. From this order an appeal was taken to the circuit court of the United States and there affirmed. To review the latter order the case is brought here.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD, after stating the facts as above reported, delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Governor of West Virginia, in his application on behalf of the state for the writ of habeas corpus to obtain the discharge of Mahon and his return to that state, proceeded upon the theory that it was the duty of the United States to secure the inviolability of the territory of the state from the lawless invasion of persons from other states, and when parties had been forcibly taken from her territory and jurisdiction to afford the means of compelling their return, and that this obligation could be enforced by means of the writ of habeas corpus, as the court in discharging the party abducted could also direct his return to the state from which he was taken, or his delivery to persons who would see that its order in that respect was carried out. If the states of the union were possessed of an absolute sovereignty, instead of a limited one, they could demand of each other reparation for an unlawful invasion of their territory and the surrender of parties abducted, and of parties committing the offense, and, in case of refusal to comply with the demand, could resort to reprisals, or take any other measures they might deem necessary as redress for the past and security
Page 127 U. S. 705
for the future. But the states of the union are not absolutely sovereign. Their sovereignty is qualified and limited by the conditions of the federal Constitution. They cannot declare war or authorize reprisals on other states. Their ability to prevent the forcible abduction of persons from their territory consists solely in their power to punish all violations of their criminal laws committed within it, whether by their own citizens or by citizens of other states.
If such violators have escaped from the jurisdiction of the state invaded, their surrender can be secured upon proper demand on the executive of the state to which they have fled. The surrender of the fugitives in such cases to the state whose laws have been violated is the only aid provided by the laws of the United States for the punishment of depredations and violence committed in one state by intruders and lawless bands from another state. The offenses committed by such parties are against the state, and the laws of the United States merely provide the means by which their presence can be secured in case they have fled from its justice. No mode is provided by which a person unlawfully abducted from one state to another can be restored to the state from which he was taken, if held upon any process of law for offense against the state to which he has been carried. If not thus held, he can, like any other person wrongfully deprived of his liberty, obtain his release on habeas corpus. Whether Congress might not provide for the compulsory restoration to the state of parties wrongfully abducted from its territory upon application of the parties or of the state, and whether such provision would not greatly tend to the public peace along the borders of the several states, are not matters for present consideration. It is sufficient now that no means for such redress through the courts of the United States have as yet been provided.
The abduction of Mahon by Phillips and his aids was made, as appears from the return of the respondent to the writ, and from the findings of the court below, without any warrant or authority from the Governor of West Virginia. It is true that Phillips was appointed by the Governor of Kentucky as agent of the state to receive Mahon upon his surrender on the
Page 127 U. S. 706
requisition, but, no surrender having been made, the arrest of Mahon and his abduction from the state were lawless and indefensible acts for which Phillips and his aids may justly be punished under the laws of West Virginia. The process emanating from the Governor of Kentucky furnished no ground for charging any complicity on the part of that state in the wrong done to the State of West Virginia.
It is true also that the accused had the right while in West Virginia of insisting that he should not be surrendered to the Governor of Kentucky by the Governor of West Virginia except in pursuance of the acts of Congress, and that he was entitled to release from any arrest in that state not made in accordance with them, but, having been subsequently arrested in Kentucky under the writs issued on the indictments against him, the question is not as to the validity of the proceeding in West Virginia, but as to the legality of his detention in Kentucky. There is no comity between the states by which a person held upon an indictment for a criminal offense in one state can be turned over to the authorities of another, though abducted from the latter. If there were any such comity, its enforcement would not be a matter within the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States. By comity nothing more is meant than that courtesy on the part of one state by which, within her territory, the laws of another state are recognized and enforced or another state is assisted in the execution of her laws. From its nature, the courts of the United States cannot compel its exercise when it is refused; it is admissible only upon the consent of the state and when consistent with her own interests and policy. @ 38 U. S. 589, Story's Conflict of Law § 30.
The only question, therefore, presented for our determination is whether a person indicted for a felony in one state, forcibly abducted from another state, and brought to the state where he was indicted by parties acting without warrant or authority of law is entitled under the Constitution or laws of the United States to release from detention under the indictment by reason of such forcible and unlawful abduction. Section 753 of the Revised Statutes declares that
"The writ
Page 127 U. S. 707
of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to a prisoner in jail unless where he is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States, or is committed for trial before some court thereof, or is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of a law of the United States, or of an order, process, or decree of a court or judge thereof, or is in custody in violation of the Constitution or of a law or treaty of the United States."
To bring the present case within the terms of this section, it is contended that the detention of the appellant is in violation of the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, that
"No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,"
and also in violation of the clause of the Constitution providing for the extradition of fugitives of justice from one state to another and the laws made for its execution.
As to the for Fourteenth Amendment, it is difficult to perceive in what way it bears upon the subject. Assuming, what is not conceded, that the fugitive has a right of asylum in West Virginia, the State of Kentucky has passed no law which infringes upon that right or upon any right or privilege of immunity which the accused can claim under the Constitution of the United States. The law of that state which is enforced is a law for the punishment of the crime of murder, and she has merely sought to enforce it by her officers under process executed within her territory. She did not authorize the unlawful abduction of the prisoner from West Virginia.
As to the removal from the state of the fugitive from justice in a way other than that which is provided by the second section of the Fourth Article of the Constitution, which declares that
"A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime,"
and the laws passed by Congress to carry the same into effect, it is not
Page 127 U. S. 708
perceived how that fact can effect his detention upon a warrant for the commission of a crime within the state to which he is carried. The jurisdiction of the court in which the indictment is found is not impaired by the manner in which the accused is brought before it. There are many adjudications to this purport cited by counsel on the argument, to some of which we will refer.
The first of these is that of Ex Parte Scott, 9 B. & C. 446. There, it appeared that the prisoner, who had been indicted in the King's Bench for perjury, and for whose apprehension a warrant had been issued, was arrested by the officer, to whom the warrant was specially directed at Brussels, in Belgium, and conveyed to England. A rule nisi was then obtained from the court for a writ of habeas corpus, and the question of her right to be released because of her illegal arrest in a foreign jurisdiction was argued before Lord Tenterden. He held that where a party charged with a crime was found in the country, it was the duty of the court to take care that he should be amenable to justice, and it could not consider the circumstances under which he was brought there, and that if the act complained of was done against the law of a foreign country, it was for that country to vindicate its own law, and the rule was discharged.
The next case is that of State v. Smith, which was very fully and elaborately considered by the Chancellor and the Court of Appeals of South Carolina. 1 Bailey 283. Though this case did not arise upon the forcible arrest in another jurisdiction of the offender to answer an indictment, but to answer to a judgment the conditional release from which he had disregarded, the principle involved was the same. Smith had been convicted of stealing a slave and sentenced to death. He was pardoned on condition that he would undergo confinement during a designated period, and within fifteen days afterwards leave the state and never return. The pardon was accepted, and the prisoner remained in confinement for the time prescribed, and within fifteen days afterwards removed to North Carolina, and remained there some years, when he returned to
Page 127 U. S. 709
South Carolina. The Governor of the latter state then issued a proclamation stating that the prisoner was in the state in violation of the condition of his pardon, and offering a reward for his arrest. Smith afterwards returned to North Carolina, where he was forcibly seized by parties from South Carolina, without warrant or authority from any officer or tribunal of either state except the proclamation of the Governor of South Carolina, and was brought into the latter state and lodged in jail. He sued out a writ of habeas corpus, and was brought before the chancellor of the state, and his discharge was moved on the ground that his arrest in North Carolina was illegal, and his detention equally so. The motion was refused and the prisoner remanded. The chancellor gave great consideration to the case, and in the following extract from his opinion furnishes an answer to the principal objections urged in the case at bar to the detention of the appellant: "The prisoner," said the chancellor,
"is charged with a felonious violation of the laws of this state. It is answered that other persons have been guilty, in relation to him, of an outrageous violation of the laws of another state, and therefore he ought to be discharged. I perceive no connection between the premises and the inference. The chief argument is drawn from the supposed consequences which are likely to follow by bringing our government into collision with others. This is less to be apprehended among the states of the union, where the federal Constitution makes provision for a satisfaction of the violated jurisdiction. But suppose the case of a foreign state. There is no offense in trying, and, if he be guilty, convicting, the subject of a foreign government, who has been guilty of a violation of our laws, within our jurisdiction. Or, if he had made his escape from our jurisdiction, and by any accident were thrown within it again; if he were shipwrecked on our coast, or fraudulently induced to land by a representation that it was a different territory, with a view to his being given up to prosecution, there would seem to be no reason for exempting him from responsibility to our laws. In the case we are considering, the prisoner is found in our jurisdiction in consequence of a lawless act of violence exercised upon him by individuals. The true
Page 127 U. S. 710
cause of offense to the foreign government is a lawless violation of its territory. But a similar violation of a foreign jurisdiction might be made for other purposes, and it would not be in the power of our tribunals to afford satisfaction. An individual might be kidnapped and brought within our territory for the purpose of extorting money from him, or murdering him. It would not seem to be an appropriate satisfaction to the injured government to exempt a person justly liable to punishment under our laws, where we have no means of giving up to punishment those who have violated its laws. But there is no difficulty among the states of the union. Upon demand by the State of North Carolina those who have violated its laws will be given up to punishment."
1 Bailey 292.
Subsequently the prisoner was brought before the presiding judge of the court of appeals of the state to answer to a rule to show cause why his original sentence should not be executed and a date fixed for his execution. He showed for cause that he had received an executive pardon, and had performed all the conditions annexed to it, except the one which prohibited his return to the state, which, it was submitted, was illegal and void. And for further cause, he showed that he had been illegally arrested in North Carolina and brought within the jurisdiction of this state against his own consent, and it was therefore insisted that he was not amenable to the courts of South Carolina, but was entitled to be sent back to North Carolina, or to be discharged, and sufficient time allowed him to return thither. The judge held the grounds to be insufficient, and the defendant then moved the court to reverse his decision on substantially the same grounds, and, among them, that he was entitled to be discharged in consequence of having been illegally arrested in North Carolina and brought into the state. Upon this, the court said:
"The pursuit of the prisoner into North Carolina and his arrest there was certainly a violation of the sovereignty of that state, and was an act which cannot be commended. But that was not the act of the state, but of a few of its citizens, for which the Constitution of the United States has provided a reparation. It gives the Governor of that state the right to
Page 127 U. S. 711
demand them of the Governor of this, and imposes on the latter the obligation to surrender them; but until it is refused, there can be no cause of complaint."
And the motion was refused.
In the case of State v. Brewster, the same doctrine was announced by the Supreme Court of Vermont. 7 Vt. 118. There it appeared that the prisoner charged with crime had escaped to Canada and was brought back against his will, and without the consent of the authorities of that province, and he sought to plead his illegal capture and forcible return in bar of the indictment, but his application was refused, the court observing that the escape of the prisoner into Canada did not purge the offense, nor oust the jurisdiction of the court, and he being within its jurisdiction it was not for it to inquire by what means or in what manner he was brought within the reach of justice. Said the court:
"If there were anything improper in the transaction it was not that the prisoner was entitled to protection on his own account. The illegality, if any, consists in a violation of the sovereignty of an independent nation. If that nation complain it is a matter which concerns the political relations of the two countries, and in that aspect is a subject not within the constitutional powers of this court."
Pp. 121-122.
In State v. Ross, 21 Ia. 467, the Supreme Court of Iowa declared the same doctrine, and stated the distinction between civil and criminal cases where the party is by fraud or violence brought within the jurisdiction of the court. The defendants were charged with larceny, and were arrested in Missouri and brought by force and against their will, by parties acting without authority, either of a requisition from the governor or otherwise, to Iowa, where an indictment against them had been found. In Iowa they were rearrested and turned over to the civil authorities for detention and trial. It was contended that their arrest was in violation of law; that they were brought within the jurisdiction of the state by fraud and violence; that comity to a sister state and a just appreciation of the rights of the citizen, and a due regard to the integrity of the law demanded that the court should under such
Page 127 U. S. 712
circumstances refuse its aid, and that there could be no rightful exercise of jurisdiction over the parties thus arrested. But the court answered that
"the liability of the parties arresting them (the defendants) without legal warrant, for false imprisonment or otherwise, and their violation of the penal statutes of Missouri may be ever so clear, and yet the prisoners not be entitled to their discharge. The offense being committed in Iowa, it was punishable here, and an indictment could have been found without reference to the arrest. There is no fair analogy between civil and criminal cases in this respect. In the one (civil), the party invoking the aid of the court is guilty of fraud or violence in bringing the defendant or his property within the jurisdiction of the court. In the other (criminal), the people, the state, is guilty of no wrong. The officers of the law take the requisite process, find the prisoners charged within the jurisdiction, and this too without force, wrong, fraud, or violence on the part of any agent of the state or officer thereof. And it can make no difference whether the illegal arrest was made in another state or another government."
Other cases might be cited from the state courts holding similar views. There is indeed an entire concurrence of opinion as to the ground upon which a release of the appellant in the present case is asked -- namely that his forcible abduction from another state and conveyance within the jurisdiction of the court holding him is no objection to his detention and trial for the offense charged. They all proceed upon the obvious ground that the offender against the law of the state is not relieved from liability because of personal injuries received from private parties or because of indignities committed against another state. It would indeed be a strange conclusion if a party charged with a criminal offense could be excused from answering to the government whose laws he had violated because other parties had done violence to him and also committed an offense against the laws of another state.
The case of Ker v. Illinois, decided by this Court, 119 U. S. 437, has a direct bearing upon the question presented here, whether a forcible and illegal capture in another state is in
Page 127 U. S. 713
violation of any rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. In that case, it appeared that Ker was indicted in Cook County, Illinois, for embezzlement and larceny. He fled the country and went to Peru. Proceedings were instituted for his extradition under the treaty between that country and the United States, and application was made by our government for his surrender, and a warrant was issued by the President, directed to one Julian, as messenger, to receive him from the authorities of Peru upon his surrender and to bring him to the United States. Julian, having the necessary papers, went to Peru, but, without presenting them to any officer of the Peruvian government or making any demand on that government for the surrender of Ker, forcibly arrested him, placed him on board the United States vessel Essex, then lying in the harbor of Callao, kept him a close prisoner until the arrival of that vessel at Honolulu, in the Hawaiian islands, where, after some detention, he was conveyed in the same forcible manner on board another vessel, in which he was carried a prisoner to San Francisco, California. Before his arrival in that state, the Governor of Illinois had made a requisition on the Governor of California, under the laws of the United States, for his delivery as a fugitive from justice. The Governor of California accordingly made an order for his surrender to a person appointed by the Governor of Illinois to receive him and take him to the latter state. On his arrival at San Francisco, he was immediately placed in the custody of this agent, who took him to Cook County, where the process of the criminal court was served upon him, and he was held to answer the indictment. He then sued out a writ of habeas corpus before the circuit court of the state, contending that his arrest and deportation from Peru was a violation of the treaty between that government and ours, and that consequently his subsequent detention under the process of the state court was unlawful. The circuit court remanded him to jail, holding that whatever illegality might have attended his arrest it could not affect the jurisdiction of the court or release him from liability to the state whose laws he had violated. He then applied to the circuit court of the
Page 127 U. S. 714
United States for a writ of habeas corpus, asking his release upon the same ground, but the court refused it, holding that it was not competent to look into the circumstances under which the capture and the transfer of the prisoner from Peru to the United States were made nor to free him from the consequences of the lawful process which had been served upon him for the offense which he was charged with having committed in the State of Illinois. When arraigned on the indictment in the trial court, he raised similar questions on a plea in abatement, which was held bad on demurrer, and after conviction he carried the case on a writ of error to the supreme court of the state, where the same conclusion was reached, and the judgment against him was affirmed. He then brought the case to this Court, where it was contended that under the treaty of extradition with Peru, he had acquired by his residence in that country a right of asylum, a right to be free from molestation for the crime committed in Illinois -- a right that he should be forcibly removed from Peru to the State of Illinois only in accordance with the provisions of the treaty, and that this right was one which he could assert in the courts of the United States. But the court answered that there was no language in the treaty on the subject of extradition which said in terms that a party fleeing from the United States to escape punishment for a crime became thereby entitled to an asylum in the country to which he had fled; that it could not be doubted that the government of Peru might, of its own accord, without any demand from the United States, have surrendered Ker to an agent of Illinois, and that such surrender would have been valid within Peru; that it could not, therefore, be claimed, either by the terms of the treaty or by implication, that there was given to a fugitive from justice in one of those countries any right to remain and reside in the other, and that if the right of asylum meant anything, it meant that. So in this case it is contended that because, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, a fugitive from justice from one state to another can be surrendered to the state where the crime was committed, upon proper proceedings
Page 127 U. S. 715
taken, he has the right of asylum in the state to which he has fled, unless removed in conformity with such proceedings, and that this right can be enforced in the courts of the United States. But the plain answer to this contention is that the laws of the United States do not recognize any such right of asylum as is here claimed on the part of a fugitive from justice in any state to which he has fled, nor have they, as already stated, made any provision for the return of parties who, by violence and without lawful authority, have been abducted from a state. There is therefore no authority in the courts of United States to act upon any such alleged right. In Ker v. Illinois, the Court said that the question of how far the forcible seizure of the defendant in another country, and his conveyance by violence, force, or fraud to this country could be made available to resist trial in the state court for the offense charged upon him was one which it did not feel called upon to decide, for in that transaction it did not see that the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States guaranteed to him any protection. So in this case we say that whatever effect may be given by the state court to the illegal mode in which the defendant was brought from another state, no right secured under the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated by his arrest in Kentucky and imprisonment there upon the indictments found against him for murder in that state.
It follows that the judgment of the court below must be
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY, with whom concurred MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting.
I dissent from the judgment of the Court in this case. In my opinion, the writ of habeas corpus was properly issued, and the prisoner, Mahon, should have been discharged and permitted to return to West Virginia. He was kidnapped, and carried into Kentucky in plain violation of the Constitution of the United States, and is detained there in continued violation thereof. It is true he is charged with having
Page 127 U. S. 716
committed a crime in Kentucky. But the Constitution provides a peaceable remedy for procuring the surrender of persons charged with crime and fleeing into another state. This provision of the Constitution has two objects: the procuring possession of the offender and the prevention of irritation between the states which might arise from giving asylum to each other's criminals and from violently invading each other's territory to capture them. It clearly implies that there shall be no resort to force for this purpose. The Constitution has abrogated, and the states have surrendered, all right to obtain redress from each other by force. The Constitution was made to "establish justice" and "insure domestic tranquility," and to attain this end as between the states themselves, the judicial power was extended "to controversies between two or more states," and they were enjoined to deliver up to each other fugitives from justice when demanded, and even fugitives from service. This manifest care to provide peaceable means of redress between them is utterly irreconcilable with any right to redress themselves by force and violence, and, of course, what is unconstitutional for the states is unconstitutional for their citizens. It is undoubtedly true that occasional instances of unlawful abduction of a criminal from one state to another for trial have been winked at, and it has been held to be no defense for the prisoner on his trial. Such precedents are founded on those which have arisen where a criminal has been seized in one country and forcibly taken to another for trial, in the absence of any international treaty of extradition. It is obvious that such cases stand on a very different ground. It is there a question between independent nations bound by no ties of mutual obligation on the subject, and at liberty to adopt such means of redress and retaliation as they please. But where an extradition treaty does exist and a criminal has been delivered up under it, he cannot, without violating the treaty, be tried for any other crime but that for which he was delivered up. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407. This shows that even when rightfully obtained for one offense, he cannot be prosecuted for another. It is true that in the same volume is found the case of Ker v.
Page 127 U. S. 717
Illinois, 119 U. S. 437, in which it was held not to be a good plea to an indictment that the prisoner was kidnapped from Peru, with which country we had an extradition treaty. But this was because, as before said, the prisoner himself cannot set up the mode of his capture by way of defense if the state from which he was abducted makes no complaint. Peru made none.
But this is not such a case. The state from which Mahon was abducted has interposed not only by a formal demand for his restoration but by suing out a habeas corpus. Perhaps the writ might have been sued out of this Court, as the controversy had come to be a controversy between the states, Kentucky having availed herself of the fruits of the unlawful abduction by retaining the victim and refusing to restore him on demand. The State of West Virginia, however, has elected, as she might do, to have the writ directed only to the person holding Mahon in custody. I take this to be a legal and apt remedy to settle the case by peaceable judicial means.
A requisition would not apply. That is provided for the extradition of fugitives from justice. It would apply for the delivery up of the kidnapers, but not for the restoration of their victim. It is a special constitutional remedy, addressed by the executive of one state to the executive of another, imposing a constitutional duty of extradition when properly made in a proper case. But the present case is a different one. It is not the surrender of a fugitive from justice which is sought, but the surrender of a citizen unconstitutionally abducted and held in custody. There must be some remedy for such a wrong. It cannot be that the states, in surrendering their right of obtaining redress by military force and reprisals, have no remedy whatever. It was suggested by counsel that the State of West Virginia might sue the State of Kentucky for damages. This suggestion could not have been seriously made. No, the remedy adopted was the proper one. Habeas corpus is not only the proper legal remedy, but a most salutary one. It is calculated to allay strife and irritation between the states by securing a judicial and peaceful decision of the controversy.
But it is contended that although it may be within the
Page 127 U. S. 718
spirit of the Constitution, it is not within its letter, and special legislation is necessary to enable the courts or judges to issue a habeas corpus. I do not think that the conclusion follows. Congress, from the beginning, clothed the courts and judges of the United States with the general power to issue writs of habeas corpus, with the restriction at first not to extend to prisoners in jail, unless in custody under authority of the United States, etc. But in 1833, 1842, and 1867, this restriction was modified, and by the last act removed altogether "in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty, in violation of the Constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States." 14 Stat. 385; Rev.Stat. § 753. And see Ex Parte Parks, 93 U. S. 18, 93 U. S. 22, where the reference to 14 Stat. should be page 385, instead of page 44. This is legislation enough. A citizen of West Virginia is deprived of his liberty contrary to the Constitution and laws of the United States. The exigency has arisen in which the law applies, and if the party himself is precluded from setting up his wrongful abduction as a defense to an indictment, and perhaps precluded from demanding his discharge on habeas corpus, his state has intervened for his protection, and has sued out the writ. But I think that his own application for the writ is well grounded. He is not in the situation of a criminal who has been abducted from a state which takes no interest in his case. His restoration has been demanded by his state, and habeas corpus may be issued either at his own instance or that of the state.
This Court does not hesitate, on the plea of insufficient legislation, to issue the writ of habeas corpus as an appellate remedy wherever a citizen is deprived of his liberty in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States and is refused a discharge by other tribunals, and has no other remedy. See Ex Parte Royal, 112 U. S. 181; Ex Parte Royal, 117 U. S. 241.
I think that the judgment of the circuit court should be reversed, and the prisoner restored to his liberty with permission to return to the State of West Virginia. I am authorized to say that MR. JUSTICE HARLAN concurs in this opinion.
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U.S. Supreme Court Mahon v. Justice (1888)
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4 Mar 1888 |
Louisville, Jefferson, Kentucky, USA |
| writ of habeas corpus. Valentine Hatfield, Selkirk and L. D. McCoy, Plant, Doc and Sam Mahon, Thomas Chambers, Moses Christian and Andy Varney, remanding them to custody, the case of Andy Varney being the test. |
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Judge Barr- Andy Varney, Hatfields & McCoys, Habeus Corpus in KY
The Courier-Journal
Louisville, Kentucky •
Sun, Mar 4, 1888 p5
CLIPPED BY
wetzupdoc • 31 January 2025
• THE THE COURIER JOURNAL:
IN FAVOR OF KENTUCKY.
Judge Barr Decides That West Virginia Cannot Get Her Hatfields.
Text of the Opinion Which Reviews the Law Bearing On the Subject.
The Case To Be Taken Tot the Supreme Court of the United States.
A Probability That the Prisoners Will Remain Here Until After Further Action.
ANXIOUS TO RETURN TO PIKE.
Judge Barr yesterday morning rendered his decision in the habeas corpus cases of Valentine Hatfield, Selkirk and L. D. McCoy, Plant, Doc and Sam Mahon, Thomas Chambers, Moses Christian and Andy Varney, remanding them to custody, the case of Andy Varney being the test. There was a general surprise at the decision among the large number gathered in the court-room to hear the result. Hon. Eustace Gibson and exGov. Knntt and Attorney General Hardin counsel for the petitioners and the State of Kentucky, were present, as were also the prisoners themselves. The decision, which was oral and occupied about a haif hour in delivery, was as follows:
IN THE MATTER OF ANDREW VARNEY.
-Aoner Justice, Jailer of Pike county, having made his return to the writ of habeas corpus issued herein, on the day of February. 1888, and Andrew Varrey having filed his response thereto and produced evidence. the Court certifies the following to be the facts as admitted by the parties or proven to the Court's satisfaction, viz: The petitioner, Varney, together with nineteen other persons, as at the September term, 1864, of the Circuit Court of Pike county, Ky., indicted by the Grand Jury impaneled in and by said Court for willful murder alleged to have been committed by them in said county. Varney was at the time and bad always been and stall is a citizen of West Virginia aud a resident of Logan county in said State, "*His Excellenev, S. B. Buckner, Governor of the State of Kentucky, on the 10th day of September, 1887, made upon His Excellency, E. Wilson, Governor of the State of Virginia, requisition under the seal of the Commonwealth, demanding of him, the Governor of West Virginia, the arrest and rendition of the said Andrew Varney and the others in said indictment to the State of Kentucky to answer the same, claiming that the said Andrew Varney and others had fled as fugitives from justice from said State. Said requisition was accompanied by copy of the indictment therein referred to, which was certited by the Governor of Kentucky to to authentic. In said requisition be appointed oue Frank Phillips agent of the State of Ken• tucky to receive said Varuey aud the others and bring them to the State of Kentucky. "This requisition was not acted upon by the Governor of West Virginia, because, as he stated, of the want of an affidavit in conformity with the laws of West Virginia.
An aftidavit was then made by said Frank Phillips in compliance with said request, and on the 8th of October, 1887, was sent by His Excellency Gov. Buckner to His Excellency Gov. Wilson. There was no further correspondence between the said Governors in regard to said requisition until the 9th of Jauu1888. In the meantime the Hon, Henry J. Walker, Secretary of state of West Virginia, by letter dated November 21. 1887, wrote to P. A. Cline, who was Depury Jailer of Pike county, in reply to a letuP of inquiry from him, and notifed him that the said requisition of the Governor of Keutucky would be bunored except as to Elias Hatfield and Andy Varney, petitioners berein, and that warrants wowd be issued for their arrest upon the receipt of $54, his tees for issuing the same. 1 he reason given for not issuing warrants for Elias Hatfield and Andrew Varney was because they were not guilty in the Governor's opinion, from the evidence which had been presented to him. SENT THE PROPER FEES.
"Subsequently, by letter dated December 18, 1887, Frank Phillips, the person appointed as agent aforesaid, wrote to his Excellency, Governor W ikon, inclosing $15 to pay fees of the Secretary of State, and requesting he should issue his warrants for the arrest of Anderson Hatfield. Johnson Hatfield, Capt. Hatfield, Daniel Whitt and Andy McCoy, and that be sent these warrants to biz (Phillips) at P. keville. In this letter be intormed the Governor Lust he did not care for, and he did pot intend to interrupt, said Elias Hatfield, and Andy Varney, and that if they wanted any of the other persons meationed in said requisition he would send for the warrants for their arrest.
This money ($15) was returned to Phillips, and the order for the warrants countermandou by Governor Wilson, because, as he states, from information subsequently obtained, to believed the requisition and expected warrants would de used, not to secure peblic justice, but to extort money from the accused. "His Excellency, Governor Buckner, on the 9th day of January. 1868, wrote to His Excellency, Governor Wilson, a letter of inquiry in regard to his action under the requisition; this letter of inquiry was replied to January 21, 1688, by Gov. ernor Wison. (See copies of said letters of Walker, Secretary of State, Phillips, Gov. Buckver and Gov. Wilson, copies of which will be annexed hereto, marked 1, 2, 5, 4.) No warrants had been issued by the Governor of West Virginia for the arrest of any persons mentioned in the said requisitions on the 9th of January, or before or since that time. Frank Phillips, with twenty-five or thirty armed men, went from Kentucky across into West Virginia, and with force and arms arrested the petitioner, Andy Varney, on January 9. 1888.1 and Against his will and by force brought him to the town of Pikeville, in the State of Kentucky, and on the lith of January, 1888, placed bun in the jail Pike county in said town, which was then in charge of Abner Justice, Jailer of said county, and on the next day, January 18, 1888, while thus confined in said jail in. said" town, be was served with bench warrant and arrested by the deputy sheriff of said county; the bench warrant under which be was arrested was issued from the Clerk's office of the Criminal Court of Pike county, which court then bad jurisdiction to issue bench warrants and try persons charged under the aforesaid Indictments.
When be was arrested Phillips was asked by Varney by what authority he did so, and he said that no was State's agent to arrest him and take him to "Pike, and that he was authorized by the Governor of West Virginia to make the arrest.
SURRENDER AND RETURN.
"His Excellency Gov. Wilson did under the seal of West Virginia demand of His Excellency Gov. Buckner the surrender and return to the State of West Virginia of the said Varney and the others who had been seized by force and arms and carried away to Pike county by said His Phillips and others, which request was declined by Excel lency Gov, Buckner on the 4th of February, 1888.
See copies of the requisition of Gov, Wilson and the reply thereto of Gov. Buckner, marked 5 and 6.1 "The question presented to the Court on this requisition is much harrower than the discussion of counsel would indicate. "As between independent States, it is now the recognized law settled by the Supreme Court that there is no duty upon one independent sovereignty to surrender to another a refugee from justice, Whatever obligation the courts would recognize must arise from treaties between such sovereignties. Thus they have recognized between Great Britain and the United States the provision of extradition as prescribed by the treaty of 1842 between the two Governments, as the law which shall govern; and it is an obligation which the courts of the United States will recognize and will not allow a person extradited to be tried for any other crime than the one for which he was dited. That conclusion is arrived at upon the construction which the court has given the treaty of 1849 between the United States and Great Britain and the Acta of Congress made to provide for extradition.
*As between the States of the Union there has been in the reasoning of some variety of views. However, I think all the authorities conour in the proposition that the right of asylum of refugee who has fled from one State to another charged with crime is not a personal right: that the refugee, when returned by whatever means he may be returned to the State from which he has fled and wherein he is charged with crime, can not plead in answer to the indictment for the crime that he has not been extradited according to law. There is in one case at least a very important statement made by very, great jurist, Judge Gibson, that in such a case where a man is brought from one State to another, though he has not the right of asylum himsell, when mand is made by the State, by reason of comity between the States, he should be surrendered because he was brought from tne State without the forms of law and contrary to the wal of the Stat, which has still sufficient sovereignty to make the demand and have it recognized matter of comity. The case which in here presented perhaps has never arisen before, at least no case has been called to my attention and have seen on the subject, and, so far as I know, the question has never been adjudicated by any State Court or Federal tribunal.
NOT BEYOND ITS JURISDICTION.
"But, whatever may be the law on this subject: this proceeding this court can not consider it because it is beyond its jurisdiction. In matters of contest where there in a controversy between States, by the express provision of the Federal Constitution the jurisdiction is in the Supreme Court, and in babess corpus proceedings the Aet of Congress limits the and consideration of babeas corpuses to the question; person Jail by authority of the State, whether he is there detained and deprived of his liberty in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the laws enacted thereunder: so that the inquiry here is narrowed to the question whether or not this petitioner was when the babeas corpus reached him in custody of the Jailer of Pike county there in violation of the Constitution of the United States. *The right of extradition of a refugee charged with crime who had fled from one State to anoth - er arises from a provision of the Federal Constitution which provides: *A person charged in any State with treason, felony or other crimes, who shall flee from justice and be found in another State, shall on demand of the executive authority of be the State removed from which he -fled, be delivered up to to toe State having jurisdiction the crime.' Now, it is the recognized law as determined by the courts that the laws of Congress passed under this provision provide how this shall be done and the evidence to be presented from one Executive to another and wherever extradition is invoked it is the settled law that the courts of the country, both State and Federal, can revise the action of the Governor who honors the requisition in so tar as to say whether the requisition which has been made and the action of the Governor thereunder, is in conformity with the Constitution and the laws made thereunder. "It is also equally the law that there is no process known to the court by which a Governor can be compelled to exercise his discretion in the matter, if there be a discretion. If he acts, his action is subject to revision of the courts; if he does not, the Supreme Court has, in effect, said whatever the obligation on the Exeentive to act, the courts cannot enforce it.
It is, however, claimed that the only lawful mode by which criminal who bas fled from one State to another can be extradited is according to she provisions of the Federal Constitution, and the terins of the acts of Congress made there, under and also according to the provisions of any State statute which may be and can be made, constitutionally, in aid of the Federal provision The question which is quite important in the consideration of this matter is, what that process is. I mean by that what kind of propose? Is it a Federal process or a State process, and if a State process, which one of the States? Recently in case in Californis the Circuit Court decided that when the agent of a State had the person who was being extradited surrendered to him, be was Federal officer, and that his action was under the Federal Constitution; and, therefore, that court decided a revision of •the authority by which be held the refugee must be done by the Federal Court and by the Federal courts alone. That conclusion was overruled by the Supreme Court and they held that both the State and Federal courts could issue a babeas corpus and consider the question whether or not an alleged refugee was unlawfully detained.
THE SETTLED LAW.
*I take it that it is now the settled law that this agent, and in this case, Phillips, bad be gotten these men would have gotten them by reason of the process of the State of West Virginia, and would have heen assisted in the arrest by the warrant of the State of West Virginia and surrender to the agent of the State of Kentucky, would have received the men by process of the State of West Virginia, and thereafter he would have heid them by a process which was under the Federal Constitution, and would have re• tained them. In no event, however, was that process a procesf of the State of Kentucky. It was a means provided by the Federal Constituton by which a refugee could be extradited from the State of West Virginia to the State of Kentucky, and it was only when the refugee was brought within the territory of the State of Kentucky that a Kentucky process could reach him, and his detention woul have been unlawful and illegal unless after he came to Kentucky he had been arrested by reguiar process from Kentucky authorities. *However, it is suggested that these persons are detained in vi. laton of the Federal Consutution.
The argument is that the only process by which they could be extradited was the process as provided by the Federal Constitution, that that was in vogue in so far as to give this court jurisdiction to revise the action taken under it. Now, it is quite clear to my mind fo n the statement already read, that, as a matter of fact, no action was taken by the authorities of West Virginia under the requisition; that Phillips, though appointed agent of the State of Kentucky, never acted in any capacity as agent. It is true that he so represented himseif to the petitioner and the others, perhaps, as having authority to arrest him from the Governor of W st Virginia, and as being the agent of the Stale of Kentucky, but that was a false statement, and, in point of fact, there was no process issued under the Federal Constitution to extradite this man. He is here without authority of law, aid, as I think, without any color of authority, Phillips represented himseif as having authority so that this court can not consider the question before it now and revise the action of Phillips, because Le was not the agent of the State of Kentucky, and because he acted under requisition in no way whatever. **We must therefore consider the other branch of the case, and that is the broad proposition that since the Fourteenth Amendment a citizen, or resident, or a sojourner, having been indicted for crine in another State, cannot be extradited from the State where he happens to be, whether citizen or sojourner, except by due process prescribed by the Federal Constitution, and unless he is thus extradited he is within the term of the provision of the Federal Coastitution.
"it is quite clear to my mind that the only legal way of arresting a refugee under such circumstances is according to the Constitution of the United States and the laws made thereunder and such laws as the State may have made in aid thereof. This being the case, it is argved that due process of law as required by the Fourteen amendment under such circumstances is, Ar the mode preseribed by the Constitution and the laws of the United States to extradite the refugee; and second, after he is extradited the process by which he is taken into custody: and this being so, that this peutioner is deprived of his liberty without due process of law. "Now the Fourteenth Amendment is in these words: 'Section 1. All persons born or natural• ized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of tue United States; nor shalt any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.'
NOT THE GRANT OF AN ASYLUM.
"You will observe that this provision of the Constitution is not the grant of an asylum or the affirmative grant of any right to the citizen. The purpose is very different; the intent is very different. It is intended to be a limitation upon the power of the State A similar provision in Pith Amendment to the Federal Constitution had limited the powers of the Federal Government, It was not conferring an individual right which he theretofore did not nave, assuming that before the Fourteenth Amendment he had no individual right of asylum himself, bnt only his State may have had the right of having him returned. This was not conferring upon any person in the United States, whether a ciuzen or otner person residing here, an individual right, but it was a limitation upon the powers of the different States. In that view, the petitinner can not be said to be deprived of his liberty without due process of law, and therefore in violation of the Federal Constitution, unless he was deprived of his liberty without due process of law by the State of Kentucky.
Now, while it is true that this process of extradition could only be invoked by the State of Kentucky, and, as the law exists, it is the only lawful process by which a man can be extradited, and while it is true tha. in this case that process has not been invoked, and that this man has not been arrested and extradited under any process, but in violation of law, by force and by he has not been so extradited by the State of Kentucky, or by an officer of the State, or by authority of the State. He has not been deprived of his liberty, therefore, under the Fourteenta Amendment. was very much inclined, when this case was first presented, to the view presented that under the circumstances under which this prisoner was brought to Kentucky, being unlawfully arrested and kidnaped, that he was entitled as a matter of constitutional right, before he could be detained in the jail of Pike county, to have both the process by which he could be extradited and the process by which he could be arrested after he was extradited, to be a due process of law. more critical examination has satisfied me that the Fourteenth Amendment must be confined by its very, construction (and that coustructiou strengthened by the history of the words which have existed since Magna Onarta, and have been used as being synonymous with laws of the land) By the very wording of the Constitution, the State may deprive the mhibition party of his liberty, else it is not within the of that instrument.
I am therefore of the opinion that this peritioner must be remanded to the custody of the State authorities. At the conclusion of the reading of the decision, Mr. Gibson arose and asked that the letter of Gov. Buckner to Gov, Wilson, stating that Philips was an agent of the State of Kentucky, which letter had been read by Gov. Knott during the argument, should go in with the Court's statements of the facts in the case, that it might be presented to the higher court in case of an appeal, Discussion on this point arose between counsel, and Judge Barr finally stated that it would be in order for them to make out for his consideration a list of papers which they desired to go before the higher court, though his record of facts, he said, would stand as read.
Mr. Gibson next asked the court what disposition would be made of the prisoners pending an appeal, and Judge Barr read the law, showing that they should he remanded to the custody of the authorities from whica they were taken by the writ, or should remain in the custody of the court beiore which the writ was returned.
WANTED BAIL.
Mr. Gibson spoke at length asking that the prisoners be allowed to give bail tor their appearance, stating that the West time Virginia would surrender them at proper to the Kentucky authorities.
General Hardin objected on the basis of the decision just delivered, showing that the court nad no jurisdiction to try the case itself, and less jurisdiction to allow bail to men indicted for murder, which the State courts could not allow.
Judge Barr sustained this view of the case, saying that his court had no jurisdiotion, and that the offense charged was not bailable.
Mr. Gibson then said that he would be unwilling for the prisoners to be returned to the Pike, county jail unless Judge Barr should issue an order showing that bail allowed by the Judge of Pike county would not be considered in the nature of contempt toward this court. The question: of removing the prisoners again provoked considerable discussion, and Judge Barr informed counsel that he would meet them at o'clock to ascertain whether they bad agreed as to the disposition of the prisoners. At that hour no agreement bad been reached and the prisoners are still in the city.
Judge Barr stated last night that the prisoners would remain here until after further action concerning the case in his court tomorrow.
PREPARING AN APPEAL.
• Mr. Gibson was also seen at the Gault House, and said:
"We are now preparing an order of appeal in the case, but Governor Wilson will be here to morrow night, and I would prefer not to state the grounds of the appeal until after consulting with him. The prisoners will remain in the city until after further action in court Monday.
"The prisoners are, some of them, very anxious to be taken back to Pike county, he continued, "and I believe they have been tampered with in some way and false hopes held out to them as to bail- being furnished for them. I do not wish them to be sent back there to remain in for I don't believe they would be safe there."
The case will now go on appeal to the United States Circuit Court, and from there probably to the Supreme Court. Attorney General Hardin shares in the desire that the case shall go to the Supreme Court, that the novel and unsettled issues involved may be adjudicated.
The prisoners are anxious te be taken back to Pike county, saying that they have not necessary clothing and comforts which their families could furnish there.
O'RILEY'S CASE.
The Charge Against the Er- Post• master of Leitehfield, On Trial In the United States Court.
Immediately after Judge Barr ! had rendered his in the Hatfield-McCoy case yesterday morning in the Federal Court, the suit against Daniel O' Riley, charged with postoffice frauds, was taken up and occupied the balance of the day. There are more than forty witnesses in the case, and it will occupy the time of the court for two or more days. The defendant, who was postmaster of Litchfield, Grayson county, from July, 1878, to December, 1885, is charged with falsifying the returns of canceliation of stamps during his term of office to the extent of about $2,600 or $2,700, The case was presented at the last term of the Federal Court, but District Attorney Wickliffe then entered nol. pros, on account of Judge Barr's ruling, excluding certain records from the Postoftice Department which the District Attorney considered material to the case. The Grand Jury, at this term of court, found a new indictment.
The only witnesses introduced yesterday were Postoffice Inspector E. F. Finley and Mr. Keheler, Disbursing Agent of the Treasury in the Postoffice Department. The latter detailed at length the cancellation of stamps, as evidenced by the official records, made by O' Riley while postmaster, and those made by Mr. J. R. Barton, his successor, who now holds the office. It was shown that the work of that nature of the present postmaster exceeded that of 0' Riley by an average of nearly $500 per quarter.
The case will probably consume all of tomorrow and will hardly go to the jury before Tuesday.
A WELL- KNOWN BOY DYING. • Little Lieutenant" Fritz Schmidt Nearing His End. Gathered about the death-bed of a ten• year-old boy on First street last night were 1-Chief of Police Whallen, ex-Lieut. of Police Hugh Bell, Officer Charley Hickey and Bill Duff, of the Fire Department. None of those mentioned were related to the dying boy, but they were all his warm friends, and were visibly affected. The little sufferer was Fritz Schmidt, known throughout the city as 44 the little Lieuten• ant." and his life was fast ebbing away.. 1 ¡No boy in the city, perhaps, is better known than little Fritz. ambition to be member of the police force or the Fire Departinent, and on no recent public parade of either ever took place thatthe familiar figure of " the little Lietenant" was not near its head. His friends of the police force had supplied him with full lieutenant's uniform and hat, and at every parade of the force last sping and summer he took the lead upon horseback or in a dog-cart. Col. Whallen and the members of the force grew very foud of the little fellow, and last night, when he was told that death was near, he sent for his friends to say good-bye. He will hardly live until sunrise this morning, as he was constantly sinking all night.
Fritz's father is a baker on First street, between Jefferson and Green, and the little boy has been of much assistance to him. Some time ago Fritz was affected with a tumor in the head, and ten physicians have treated him, but without avail. He lost the sight of one of his eyes, and finally bloodpoisoning and paralysis set in. He has continued to sink, and last night was. probably his last upon earth.
Demise of an Old Citizen, Mr. Jeremiah Montz, the venerable father of Mr. W. E. Monte, Marshal of the Chancery Court, died at his residence, Second street, near Chestnut, early yesterday morning of paralysis. He was seized with a shock some time ago, and was supposed for time to be beyond danger, but within the past few days he had gradually grown weaker until his death.
Mr. Montz was a native of Pennsylvania, and came to Louisville forty years ago to engage in the grocery business. With the advent of the last Administration, however, he became a United States storekeeper, and until the time of his paralytic stroke, five weeks ago, was one of the most active men in the service. The funeral will take place at 8:80 o'clock this afternoon from Christ church, Second street, near Green, of which Mr. Monte was for many years a devout member, and the interment will occur in Cave Hill cemetery.
Caught On An Old Charge.
Domnie Higgins, 4 young man living in the East End, was arrested early yesterday morning by Officers Guilds and Eaton, and placed in -street station. Higgins was arrested for cutting Pat McLaughlin, a wellknown character living at the corner of Fulton and Preston streets, in a quarrel which occurred about six months ago. Higgins evaded the authorities at the time by guing over to Jeffersonville.
Friday night he returned home to his brother's, on Marshall and Campbell streets, and was captured by the policemen. Civil Service Examination. An examination of applicants for the Classified Departmental Service at Wash• ington will be held in the United States Court-room in this city. next Saturday, commencing at 9 o'clock L. M.
Applicants for examination should write to the Secretary of the Uhited States Civil-service Commission, at Washington, for application blanks. For the Cyclone Sufferers. Mr. Thomas O. Dunlop will give an art entertainment in the large Liederkranz Hall on Thursday, April 5, for the benefit of the Mount Vernon cycione sufferers.
The subject will be a journey through Switzerland and Italy, with nearly a hundred illustrations. Tickets will be ready for sale this week. Prudence! Prudence! In medication, 10 aught else, prude 305 should b: our guide. Yet thousands cast 18 to the winds. Every cos nostrum finca its patrons, he medical umpir ea of every la school have eir gulls, Every change in tie gamut of moug is rung is time at least notes beit g fun ished by tie In LA, P./ to the nuny ised imposof the day stand Hostetter's stomach Bitters, now in its third decade of ppalarity, approved and recon by pi y by the press of many lends, soughs and prized by -invalids everywhere. It is an ascertained specific for and preventive of me a lal eases; Panic indigestion, liver complaint and constibutton, checks the growth of u natism and neuralgi a peerless invizorant and useful dinretie Nervous people batedt be.
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Hatfield-McCoy WV_KY stay News_CourierJournal18880304_5 20250131GHLn- noch
Judge Barr- Andy Varney, Hatfields & McCoys, Habeus Corpus in KY
The Courier-Journal
Louisville, Kentucky •
Sun, Mar 4, 1888 p5
CLIPPED BY
wetzupdoc • 31 January 2025
• THE THE COURIER JOURNAL:
IN FAVOR OF KENTUCKY.
Judge Barr Decides That West Virginia Cannot Get Her Hatfields.
Text of the Opinion Which Reviews the Law… |
| jurisprudence |
Sep 1889 [3] |
| Paw Paw Incident: Joseph Hatfield Deposition- The killing of Tolbert, Pharmer, and Bud McCoy by a Hatfield-led gang on August 8, 1882 represented one of the most sensational events of the Hatfield-McCoy Feud. What follows is Joseph Hatfield’s deposition regarding the affair: |
- 20230524GHLn-
Brandon Ray Kirk
Paw Paw Incident: Joseph Hatfield Deposition (1889)
Monday 04 Jun 2018
Posted by Brandon Ray Kirk in Culture of Honor, Hatfield-McCoy Feud, Matewan?
The killing of Tolbert, Pharmer, and Bud McCoy by a Hatfield-led gang on August 8, 1882 represented one of the most sensational events of the Hatfield-McCoy Feud. What follows is Joseph Hatfield’s deposition regarding the affair:
COMMONWEALTH VS DOC MAYHORN &C
Bill of Exceptions
FILED Sept. 1889
G.W. Pinson, Clk
IMG_9725
Joseph Hatfield was then introduced as a witness for Deft. whos Testified as followeth. I know the Defts. I was a justice of the peace in 1882. Mathew hatfield had charge of the McCoy Boys. I Don’t remember of having seen either one of the Defts. on Blackbary Creek the Day when the McCoy Boys was Taken from the officers. Wall Hatfield said to Randolph McCoy after the Crowd had started Down the Creek with the Prisoners. We understand that we are to be Bush whacked and if we are we will kill the three Boys.
To the above testimony of Jo Hatfield the Deft. objected at the Time and still objects. The Court over ruled the objection. Defts. excepts and still excepts.
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| Race |
White [2] |
| Name |
Doc |
| Name |
Doc Mahon |
| Name |
Doc Mayhorn [4] |
- Almost until the day of his death, Allen carried a sadness in his heart over the death of his father in the days of the famous feud. His father, a peaceable man, was not an active member of the fighting group of the Hatfields during the trouble between his family and the McCoys but was named in warrants along with two of his sons-in-law, Doc and Plyant Mayhorn. Allen Hatfield, but ten years old at the time, remembered that his father Wall, thinking that he had nothing to fear in the courts of Kentucky, wrote the prosecuting attorney of Pike County that he and his sons-in-laws wished to surrender in Pikeville and stand trial for crimes for which they were accused. Allen Hatfield recalled the incident from his boyhood, including the feud. His father did go to Pikeville to voluntarily stand trial and clear his name but he was convicted by a prejudiced jury, the son remembered, and was sentenced to life imprisonment at the Kentucky State Prison in Frankfort. After sentencing, he lived about one year and his burial place is still unknown today. The two Mayhorns served several years and were later pardoned.
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| Death |
Jun 1940 |
Kentucky, USA [1] |
| Person ID |
I92515 |
WETZEL-SPRING |